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I. INTRODUCTION
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (hereinafter “Hague Convention”) was created to
provide a structural regime for the return of children who have
been wrongfully abducted to another country.2 It has found a
niche in divorce and custody disputes, here in the United States
and abroad. Under the Hague Convention, a petitioning parent
1. J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Miami School of Law; B.S., 2010, Rice
University. I would like to thank Professor Bernard Perlmutter of the University of
Miami School of Law for his insight and guidance. A special thanks also to my family
for their continued support and encouragement.
2. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art.
1, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 111670 (entered into force Dec. 1,
1983) [hereinafter Hague Convention on Child Abduction].
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may ask the court in a signatory state to grant the return of the
child to his rightful habitual residence with the purpose of deter-
ring the other parent from crossing international boundaries to
retain sole custody of the child, or to seek custody from a more
sympathetic court.3 The Hague Convention does not, however,
provide for a resolution on the merits of the custody dispute; it
only affords for the return of a child.4 The divorce and custody pro-
ceedings must be conducted in the courts of the child’s habitual
residence.5
In an age where affordable transnational travel has made
international abductions a tempting option, the Hague Conven-
tion has become a powerful legal resource for those left-behind
parents who claim that their child has been wrongfully removed to
another nation.6 In 2009 alone, 478 children were returned to
their habitual countries under Hague Convention protocols.7 The
Hague Convention makes returns possible by providing a concrete
method for the expeditious return of abducted children.8 Specifi-
cally, its text delineates the proper practice for member state com-
pliance with the Convention’s purposes and objectives.9
Despite its overwhelming comprehensiveness, the Hague
Convention has one specific shortcoming—it fails to assert
whether courts retain jurisdiction over an appeal after a child has
returned to his habitual country pursuant to a Hague Convention
return order.10 The U.S. courts were, therefore, left to rely on their
judicial discretion when making a jurisdictional determination in
those circumstances. The result was a severe split amongst the
federal appellate courts on whether the U.S. courts retained the
authority to review a district court’s return order after the child’s
departure from the United States.
The conflict stemmed from varying applications of the moot-
3. Outline-Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1 (July 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf.
4. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 19.
5. See Outline-Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Emily Lynch, Note, Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont: The Second Circuit
Court’s Interpretation of Custody Rights Undermines the Purpose of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 41 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 221, 225 (2010).
7. Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 6 (April 2010), http://travel.
state.gov/pdf/2010ComplianceReport.pdf [hereinafter Report on Compliance with the
Hague Convention].
8. See generally Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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ness doctrine, which provides that a case is moot if there no longer
exists a case or controversy to be resolved. If a case is deemed
moot, appellate courts do not have authority to give an opinion
and therefore have no grounds to hear such case on appeal. The
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits shared the minority view that
removal of the child from the country moots a pending appeal and
that all further remedies must be sought in the foreign court
where the child now resides. Other circuits, in contrast, strongly
rejected such a narrow interpretation of the mootness doctrine
and argued for permitting appellate review in such instances. In
light of these disagreements, the Supreme Court decided to review
the issue in Chafin v. Chafin,11 ultimately ruling that the return of
the child to a foreign country pursuant to an order under the
Hague Convention does not render an appeal of that order moot.12
While the issues in the case derived from a primarily procedu-
ral issue, particularly the appellate court’s degree of review
authority, the intrinsic implications of the decision make it one of
monumental importance in the field of family law. This Casenote
argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Chafin v. Chafin was
correct in light of the existing applicable mootness law, and its
effects on future international child abduction cases. Part II of
this Note discusses the Hague Convention and the purpose for its
inception. Part II also provides background on the United States’
adoption and interpretation of the treaty through the ratification
of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. Part III exam-
ines the conflicting case law from the various U.S. federal circuit
courts that led to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to review
the issue at hand. Part III further presents the relevant facts per-
taining to Chafin v. Chafin, and outlines the lower court’s deci-
sions as well as the issues presented to the Supreme Court.  Part
IV of this Note begins with a cursory summary of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chafin v. Chafin, and then provides an in-
depth analysis of the Court’s reasoning. Specifically, this section
explains why the Court’s decision was correct by exploring the
merits of the case, and highlighting the legal and substantive fac-
tors that provided support for a favorable outcome. Part V investi-
gates the possible implicit social and policy reasons behind the
Court’s ruling. The Court’s decision is based on considerations of
the potential consequences its judgment would have on future
international child custody disputes, particularly with regards to
11. 133 S.Ct. 1017 (2013).
12. Id. at 1023-27.
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the child’s psychological and physical well-being and the hurdles
that arise from litigation abroad. Part VI considers what effects
appellate review would have on the general disputes in Chafin.
This Note argues that the Court was not confined to a legalis-
tic interpretation of the mootness doctrine and instead embraced a
more liberal approach that acknowledged the severe effects an
adverse finding would have had on future child custody disputes.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction is a multilateral treaty, developed by the Hague
Convention on Private International Law on October 25, 1980,
that provides a procedure for the prompt return of children who
have been victims of cross-border abductions and wrongful reten-
tions from the state of their habitual residence.13 The treaty pro-
vides for the return of children only between contracting states.14
Currently, the treaty has eighty-nine contracting states.15 The
objectives of the treaty are premised on the protection and promo-
tion of the child’s best interest in matters relating to his custody,16
and the preclusion of the wrongful parent from gaining an advan-
tage from the abduction.17
By becoming signatories to the Hague Convention, states
express their intentions to become parties to the treaty; signature
alone, however, does not legally oblige a state to abide by the
treaty guidelines.18 The Hague Convention legally binds only
those states that ratify the treaty.19 A state may alternatively
choose to accede to the Hague Convention, instead of ratifying it,
as a way of affirming its commitment to the treaty, but without
13. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 1.
14. Id.
15. Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24 (last
visited May 27, 2013).
16. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at prologue.
17. Outline-Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining
that the purpose of the principle of prompt return is to deter abductions and is
designed to restore the “the status quo which existed before the wrongful removal” so
as to deprive the wrongful parent of any advantage that might be gained from
fleeing).
18. Caeli Elizabeth Kimball, Barriers to the Successful Implementation of the
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 561, 568-69 (2005).
19. Id. at 569.
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actually becoming bound by its terms.20
In 1998, the United States ratified the treaty and imple-
mented its provisions through a federal statute,21 known as the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).22 The pur-
pose of ICARA is to “establish procedures for the implementation
of the Convention in the United States.”23 ICARA grants federal
and state courts concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under
the Convention,24 and specifically directs them to determine cases
in strict accordance with the Convention guidelines.25
Members to the Convention are directed to “designate a Cen-
tral Authority to discharge the duties which are imposed by the
Convention.”26 The Central Authority in each state is responsible
for promoting cooperation from the state’s authorities to secure
the prompt return of abducted children and achieve the general
objectives of the Convention.27 Parents seeking the return of an
abducted child are directed to apply with the Central Authority of
the child’s habitual residence or that of any other contracting
state for assistance in securing the return of the child.28
To establish a prima facie case of wrongful removal or reten-
tion, the parent must establish “that the child was habitually
residing in the other State; that the removal or retention of the
child constituted a breach of custody rights attributed by the law
of that State; and that the applicant was actually exercising those
rights at the time of the wrongful removal or retention.”29 Rights
of custody include “rights relating to the care of the person of the
child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of
residence.”30 Custody rights are established “by operation of law or
by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of
20. Id.
21. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1021.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (West).
23. § 11601(b)(1).
24. 42 U.S.C§ 11603(a).
25. § 11603(d).
26. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 6.
27. Id. at art. 7 (responsibilities include locating the whereabouts of a child who
has been wrongfully removed or retained; preventing further harm to the child or
prejudice to interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures;
securing the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of
the issues; and providing such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and
appropriate to secure the safe return of the child).
28. Id. at art. 8.
29. Id. at art. 3.
30. Id. at art. 5.
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an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.”31
The Hague Convention similarly protects parental rights of
access,32 which is the “right to take a child for a limited period of
time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.”33 How-
ever, in the case of access rights violations, the parent may only
request that the contracting state “make arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access,”34
not for the absolute return of the child.
Once the prima facie case has been established, the court may
reject the parent’s return request if: the parent was not actually
exercising custody rights at the time of removal or retention;35 the
parent had consented to or subsequently acquiesced to the
removal or retention;36 there is a grave risk that return would
expose the child to physical or psychological harm;37 the child
objects to being returned and is of age and maturity to make such
decisions;38 or return would not be permitted “by the fundamental
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”39 Additionally, the
courts are given discretion to refuse a request for the return of a
child if the application was made a year after the removal or
retention occurred and the child is now settled in the new
environment.40
If the country in which the child has been taken determines
that the child has been wrongfully removed from his habitual resi-
dence, the court has the authority to order that the child be
returned to his home country.41 If the court issues a return order,
the child must be returned to his habitual residence. The treaty,
however, does not define habitual residence and has left its inter-
pretation to the courts. This method of interpretation has proved
to be problematic as increasingly diverse interpretations emerge
in different jurisdictions. In the United States for instance, the
courts are split as to whether habitual residence should be deter-
mined exclusively based on the child’s interests or the intentions
31. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 3.
32. Id. at prologue.
33. Id. at art. 5.
34. Id. at art. 7.
35. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 13.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at art. 20.
40. Id. at art. 12.
41. Lynch, supra note 6, at 227.
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of the parents.42
Return of the child to his habitual residence relies exclusively
on the cooperation of the member states to the treaty. Once the
habitual residence has been determined and a return order has
been granted, the contracting state where the child has been
sequestered has the role of administering the safe return of the
child.43 Central authorities in the contracting state are responsible
for providing assistance in locating the child and ensuring his or
her return, either by the parent’s cooperation or through neces-
sary administrative arrangements and proceedings.44 In essence,
the smooth return of the child is predicated on compliance
between member states. The reality, however, is often not so easy.
Non-compliance by contracting states has become increasingly
problematic.45 The U.S. Department of State’s most recent annual
compliance report indicates that a significant number of member
states voluntarily choose to not comply with the Convention,
either by denying Convention return applications, holding that
domestic laws relating to child custody disputes supersede the
Convention, or by judicial non-compliance.46
Furthermore, a return order, although a giant step towards
safeguarding the well-being of a child, does not determine custody
or guarantee that the child will remain in his habitual residence
indefinitely. A return order simply returns the child to the juris-
42. Compare Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400-03 (6th Cir. 1993) (This
case demonstrates the child-centered approach in the determination of habitual
residence. In Friedrich, the father petitioned the US courts for the return of the child
to Germany pursuant to the Hague Convention. The court held that in deciding the
child’s habitual residence, the court “must focus on the child, not the parents, and
examine past experience, not future intentions.” The simple fact that the child was
born in Germany and had resided there exclusively until his mother removed him to
the United States was sufficient to establish that Germany was his habitual
residence. Any changes that occurred after the removal, including obtaining U.S.
citizenship, were future events created by the parents’ actions that established legal
residence and are irrelevant to the inquiry. Legal residence is not synonymous with
habitual residence, and “habitual residence cannot be so easily altered.”), with Mozes
v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1081-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (Here the court focuses on parental
intention when deciding habitual residence. In this case the father petitioned for the
return of his children to Israel pursuant to the Hague Convention. The court held that
habitual residence is that which has supplanted the previous residence as the “locus
of the children’s family and social development.” This is determined from the
circumstances which must “enable the court to infer a shared intent to abandon the
previous habitual residence,” such as by mutual agreement between the parents.).
43. Outline-Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, at 2.
44. Id.
45. See generally Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 7.
46.  Id.
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diction that is most appropriate to determine the child’s custody.47
Thus, although the child may be returned to his habitual resi-
dence, it is only the beginning of the long process to determine the
child’s future.
III. THE ROAD TO CHAFIN
Although the Hague Convention provides a comprehensive
guideline on the proper implementation of the aims of the treaty,
it fails to assert whether courts retain jurisdiction over an appeal
after a child has returned to his habitual country pursuant to a
Hague Convention return order. This gap, in turn, gives the mem-
ber states autonomy to use judicial discretion when making a
jurisdictional determination in those instances. In the United
States, however, this led to inconsistent results.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chafin, which pro-
vided a uniform standard for interpretation of the treaty, the fed-
eral appellate courts were deeply divided on whether U.S. courts
retained the authority to review a district court’s return order
after the child’s departure from the United States. The conflict
stemmed from varying applications of the mootness doctrine.
A. Mootness Explained
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits a federal court’s
jurisdiction to live “cases and controversies.”48 No case or contro-
versy exists when the issues presented are no longer alive or the
parties lack a cognizable interest in the outcome.49 When no case
or controversy exists, the case is said to be moot.50 However, a case
becomes moot ‘“only when it is impossible for a court to grant any
effectual relief” to the parties.”’51 So long as the parties have a
‘“concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation,
the case is not moot.”’52 Thus, in instances where the controversy
in question has already been resolved and the court’s decision in a
civil action or appeal will not affect the rights of the parties or
affect the matter in issue in the case, the case is considered moot.53
47. Outline-Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, at 1; see also Hague
Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 16, 19.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1023.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Knox v. Service Employees International Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277,
2287 (2012)).
52. Id.
53. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (Our duty “[i]s to decide actual
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B. The Divide Explained: An Analysis of the Differing
Applications of the Mootness Doctrine
Until Chafin was decided, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits
shared the minority view that removal of the child from the
United States moots a pending appeal and that all further reme-
dies must be sought in the foreign court where the child currently
resides. In Bekier v. Bekier, the Eleventh Circuit found that an
appeal of a district court’s return order pursuant to the Hague
Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA) is rendered moot when the child returns to his country of
habitual residence because there is no longer a live case or contro-
versy.54 The court opined that a case becomes moot when a child
returns to his habitual country because the U.S. courts become
powerless to grant any effectual relief to the appellant55 and any
decisions made by the U.S. courts in an appellate action are not
binding or influential on any foreign court’s decision for the return
of the child. Essentially, the court reasoned that any decisions by
the U.S. courts would be merely advisory.56 Potential remedies
that the petitioning party seeks lie in the foreign courts where the
child now resides.57 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in March v. Levine
granted stay of an order to return a child recognizing that the
immediate return of the child abroad would effectively moot an
appeal.58
In contrast, courts in other federal circuits rejected this nar-
row interpretation of the mootness doctrine and argued for appel-
late review in spite of a child’s departure from the United States.59
For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Fawcett v. McRoberts found
that an appeal of a return order was not moot even if the child had
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions
upon moot questions or abstract propositions.”); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
587 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Our job is to decide cases that matter in the
real world, not those that don’t.” (quoting Leser v. Berridge, 668 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th
Cir. 2011))).
54. Bekier v. Bekier, 248 F.3d 1051, 1052 (11th Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 1055.
56. Id. at 1054.
57. Id.
58. March v. Levine, 136 F. Supp. 2d 831, 861 (M.D. Tenn. 2000), aff’d 249 F.3d
462 (6th Cir. 2001).
59. See generally Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 545 (3rd Cir. 2004) (finding
that an appeal of a return order pursuant to the Hague Convention is not moot even
after the child’s return to her country of habitual residence. The court reasoned that
because relief may still be granted in response to the continuing appeal for the return
of the child, a live issue remains for the court to decide.).
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returned to his country of habitual residence.60 The court
explained that compliance with the trial court’s order does not
moot an appeal if it “ ‘remains possible to undo the effects of com-
pliance or if the order will have a continuing impact on future
action.’”61 The court noted that there was “no law of physics”
which would render it impossible for the parent living abroad to
comply with a judgment by the appellate court or by the district
court on remand.62 Furthermore, the petitioning parent could rely
on mechanisms available for enforcing a judgment by the U.S.
courts abroad.63 In this case, the petitioning parent could resort to
the United Kingdom’s Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985,
which codified the Hague Convention there.64 The Act mandates
that a “ ‘decision to which [Articles 7 and 12 of the Hague Conven-
tion] appl[y] which was made in a Contracting State other than
the United Kingdom shall be recognized in each part of the United
Kingdom as if made by a court having jurisdiction’” in the United
Kingdom.65
In light of these disagreements among the courts, the
Supreme Court agreed to review this issue in the case Chafin v.
Chafin.
C. Chafin v. Chafin: Factual Background and
Procedural History
In Chafin, the dispute arose from a custody battle between a
U.S. Army sergeant and his former Scottish wife over their daugh-
ter.66 The two married in Germany in 2006, and their daughter
was born the following year.67 When Mr. Chafin was deployed to
Afghanistan, Ms. Chafin moved to Scotland with their daughter.68
After his deployment, however, the two decided to remain sepa-
rated.69 In 2009, Mr. Chafin was transferred to Huntsville,
Alabama.70
Despite their separation, Ms. Chafin moved to Alabama with
60. Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 497 (4th Cir. 2003).
61. Id. at 494.
62. Id. at 496.
63. Id. at 496-97.
64. Id. at 497.
65. Id.
66. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 638 (2012) (No.
11-1347).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 4.
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their daughter to reside with Mr. Chafin.71 Ms. Chafin traveled
back and forth between Scotland and the U.S., but their daughter
remained in Alabama the entire time.72 In mid-2010, the parties
divorced and the court granted them full and complete joint legal
and physical custody of the child.73 Meanwhile, the daughter
remained in an American school and acclimatized to her life in
Alabama.74
On December 24, 2010, Ms. Chafin was arrested for domestic
violence.75 The incident alerted the U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) officials that she had overstayed her
visa.76 She was consequently deported in February 2011, during
which time the child remained under the care of Mr. Chafin.77
On May 2, 2011, Ms. Chafin filed an action in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Alabama for the return of
the child to Scotland, which she contended was the child’s habit-
ual residence.78 She filed the petition under the Hague Convention
and ICARA.79 The court determined that Scotland was in fact the
child’s habitual residence and ordered the return of the child pur-
suant to the Hague Convention.80 In response, Mr. Chafin filed a
motion to stay the district court’s order, but the court denied his
request.81 Within hours of the district court’s order, Ms. Chafin
went to Scotland with the child.82
Mr. Chafin subsequently appealed the district court’s order to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.83 In February
2012, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mr. Chafin’s appeal as moot,
citing Bekier v. Bekier84 as precedent.85 The court remanded the
case to the District Court with the instructions to dismiss the case
71. Id.
72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 638 (2012) (No.
11-1347).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1022.
78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 638 (2012) (No.
11-1347).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 8.
84. 248 F.3d 1051, 1055 (2001) (holding that an appeal of a Hague Convention
order is rendered moot when the child has been returned to his habitual residence
because the court becomes powerless to grant relief.)
85. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1022.
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as moot and to vacate the order.86 On remand, the District Court
vacated the order.87 The court further ordered Mr. Chafin to pay
Ms. Chafin’s court costs, attorney’s fees, and travel expenses,
totaling over $94,000.88
IV. CHAFIN V. CHAFIN: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
In light of the divided circuit courts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, and settle the issue once and for all.89 The result
was a 9-0 decision. In the unanimous opinion, delivered by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court held that a child’s return to his habit-
ual residence pursuant to an order under the Hague Convention
does not render an appeal of that order moot.90 The Court rea-
soned that this is not a case concerning “ ‘hypothetical state of
facts’”; instead, it involves concrete issues that continue to be
under dispute, in which the parties continue to hold a cognizable
interest.91
In forming its opinion, the Court primarily relied on a legalis-
tic interpretation of the mootness doctrine. Specifically, the cen-
tral question was whether the U.S. courts could grant relief to the
parties.92 The Court ultimately applied a less restrictive approach
to appellate review, reasoning that the mootness doctrine bars
appellate review only in those instances where relief is impossi-
ble.93 But, the Court’s decision was not confined to a legalistic
interpretation of the mootness doctrine alone. Instead, it also
embraced a more liberal approach that acknowledged the purpose
of the Hague Convention and the severe effects an adverse finding
would have on future child international child abduction
disputes.94
A. An In-Depth Analysis of the Opinion
The Court’s holding rested on the conclusion that U.S. courts
could grant Mr. Chafin effectual relief despite the child’s return to
86. Id. at 1023.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1028.
91. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1023-24.
92. Id. at 1029.
93. Id. at 1020.
94. Id. at 1026.
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Scotland.95 Specifically, the courts could grant reversal of the Dis-
trict Court’s return order and the expense order against Mr.
Chafin.96
The Court first analyzed whether the type of appellate relief
Mr. Chafin sought with regard to the child would be effectual.97
Specifically, the Court analyzed Mr. Chafin’s petition for a rever-
sal of the District Court’s determination that the child’s habitual
residence was Scotland, and if that was successful, his petition for
an issuance of a re-return order.98 In conducting its analysis, the
Court applied a strict legalistic interpretation of the mootness doc-
trine and withheld from an exhaustive assessment of the merits of
the arguments.
For instance, Ms. Chafin argued that the case was moot
because the District Court lacked the authority to “issue a re-
return order either under the Convention or pursuant to its equi-
table powers.”99 Instead of exploring the more complex and argua-
bly the more difficult question on the limits of the District Court’s
authority, the Court adopted a more simplified, fundamental
application of the mootness doctrine. The Court dismissed Ms.
Chafin’s argument as confusing the issue of mootness with the
merits of the case,100 reasoning that Mr. Chafin’s claims for a re-
return order, whether pursuant to the Convention itself or accord-
ing to general equitable principles, “cannot be dismissed as so
implausible that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction.”101 The
Court relied on Powell v. McCormack,102 where it held that a claim
95. Id. at 1024-27.
96. See generally id. at 1024-27.
97. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1024.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (in McCormack v. Powell, petitioner Adam Clayton Powell,
Jr. was elected from the 18th Congressional District of New York to serve in the
United States House of Representatives for the 90th Congress. Pursuant to a House
resolution, however, he was not permitted to take his seat. Powell subsequently filed
suit in Federal District Court, claiming that the House could exclude him only if he
failed to meet the standing requirements contained in Art. I of the Constitution.
Powell met these requirements, thus he claimed excluding him was unconstitutional.
The District Court dismissed the complaint “for want of jurisdiction of the subject
matter,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Respondents argued that the case must be dismissed because the
House of Representatives of the 90th Congress had officially terminated him on
January 3, 1969, and Powell was seated as member of the 91st Congress. As such,
because petitioner’s complaint was based on the refusal to let him take his seat in the
90th Congress, and that because the House of Representatives is not a continuing
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for backpay saved the case from mootness despite the fact that the
case had been brought in the wrong court where the relief sought
was unattainable.103  Similarly here, even if the District Court
lacks the authority to issue a re-return order, this would not
render Mr. Chafin’s case moot, as his right to recover is not a
question to be answered during a mootness inquiry.104 The Court
ultimately affirmed that an appellant’s chance of success on the
merits is not relevant in determining whether a case is moot.
Similarly, the Court rejected Ms. Chafin’s second argument
that even if Mr. Chafin obtained a reversal on the District Court’s
order establishing the child’s habitual residence, and the District
Court issued a re-return order, any relief would be ineffectual
because Scotland would not comply.105 Rather than delving into
various mechanisms through which judgments passed by the U.S.
courts may be enforced abroad, especially in the Hague Conven-
tion context, the Court reasoned that the case would not be moot
by virtue of the U.S. courts’ continued personal jurisdiction over
Ms. Chafin.106 In the case that Scotland chose to ignore a U.S.
return order or decline in assisting in its enforcement, the U.S.
courts could still command compliance by forcing Ms. Chafin to
comply under the threat of sanctions.107 In the alternative, Ms.
Chafin could choose to voluntarily comply with the re-return
order.108 Uncertainty regarding the enforcement of compliance
would not alone render the case moot.109 The unanimous opinion
explained that U.S. courts often decide cases against foreign
nationals, deportees, and insolvent defendants, despite the uncer-
tainty for compliance.110
The Court then analyzed Mr. Chafin’s petition to vacate the
District Court’s award of $94,000 to Ms. Chafin, for court costs,
attorney’s fees, and travel expenses.111 The Court again relied on a
body and Powell has now been seated, his claims are moot. The Court, reasoning that
a case is moot only when “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” concluded that the case was not moot
because “Powell’s claim for back salary remains viable even though he has been
seated in the 91st Congress.”).
103. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1024.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1025.
107. Id. at 1025.
108. Id.
109. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1025.
110. See id. at 1025.
111. Id. at 1026.
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restricted analysis on the effectiveness of the relief sought based
on the mootness principles.112 The Court dismissed Ms. Chafin’s
contention that the case was moot because Mr. Chafin was not
entitled to relief vacating the expense order on account of his fail-
ure to pursue an appeal of the order, which was entered as a sepa-
rate judgment.113 Again, the Court found that Ms. Chafin’s
argument went to the merits of the case, rather than addressing
the mootness question.114 Although Mr. Chafin’s chances of suc-
cess were uncertain, they were not so implausible so as to render
the case moot.115 In fact, there exists “authority for the proposition
that failure to appeal such judgments separately does not pre-
clude relief.”116 Even a partial remedy, while not fully satisfactory,
would be sufficient to prevent a case from being moot.117 Inquiry
into, and the eventual determination on the merits of Mr. Chafin’s
requests, is left to the lower courts and is not relevant in the moot-
ness question.118
Ms. Chafin further argued for the necessity of rendering these
cases moot in order to further the purpose of the Hague Conven-
tion and ICARA. The justices disagreed. The Court explained that
the goals of the Hague Convention and ICARA (to secure the
prompt return of wrongfully removed children) will be best served
through the full judicial process, not through the manipulation of
constitutional doctrines to hold these cases out as moot.119 In fact,
doing so could undermine the goals of the treaty and harm the
children it is meant to protect,120 as it would entice parents to flee
the jurisdiction to moot the case121 and encourage the courts to
“grant stays as a matter of course, to prevent the loss of any right
to appeal.”122 These routine stays would conflict with the treaty’s
purpose in multiple ways. First, where one parent is pursuing a
meritless appeal, it would cause the child to lose “precious months
when she could have been readjusting to life in her country of
habitual residence.”123 Routine stays would also increase the num-
112. See id. at 1026.
113. Id. at 1026.
114. Id.
115. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1026.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1026-27.
120. Id. at 1027.
121. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1027.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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ber of appeals, as losing parents are more likely to appeal when
granted an automatic stay.124
To prevent the negative consequences of a blanket application
of routine stays, and to ensure that each case receives the individ-
ualized treatment necessary to ensure the best interests of the
child, the Court provided guidance for the lower courts to follow in
future cases.125 Justice Roberts’ opinion suggested that the lower
courts apply the four traditional stay factors when determining
whether to stay a return order: “ ‘(1) whether the stay applicant
has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the mer-
its; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a
stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the pub-
lic interest lies.’”126
B. The Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg delivered the concurring opinion, joined by
Justices Scalia and Breyer.127 While the concurring justices agreed
with the Court that the case is not moot because the courts may
provide Mr. Chafin with effectual relief,128 their concurring opin-
ion went far beyond a strictly legal construction of the mootness
doctrine. Instead, it focused heavily on the importance of further-
ing the objectives of the Hague Convention, and on the social
implications its decision would have on future custodial
disputes.129
The concurring justices stated that this case highlights “the
need for both speed and certainty” in Hague cases,130 so as to
ensure that the main objective of the treaty—to secure the prompt
return of wrongfully removed children.131 They further noted that
both the treaty and ICARA are silent on the appropriate time
frame for appellate review; thus it rests on each contracting state
to ensure that appeals proceed without delay.132 The broad issue in
this case, therefore, is to identify a standardized appellate process
that would avoid the shuttling of children back and forth across
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1027.
127. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1028.
128. Id. at 1029.
129. See generally id. at 1028-31.
130. Id. at 1029.
131. Id. at 1028.
132. Id.
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international borders.133
The concurrence opinion agreed with the majority that stays
should not be granted as a “ ‘matter of course’” because in
instances where appeals are not successful, they result in a loss of
time where the child could have been readjusting to life in his
habitual country.134 In order to devise a viable appellate process,
the concurrence looked for guidance from the appellate procedures
employed by England and Wales for Hague Convention cases.135 In
England and Wales, to pursue an appeal from a return order,
leave must be obtained from the first instance judge or the Court
of Appeals.136 Leave is granted only where the appeal has a real
chance of success or where there is a compelling reason as to why
the appeal should not be denied.137 The appeal does not trigger an
automatic stay.138 If an appeal is granted, the court that granted
leave ordinarily will order a stay.139 The appeal then goes on a fast
track, where disposition is expected within six weeks.140 The
English appellate process for Hague Convention cases essentially
provides for speedy determinations “without turning away appel-
lants whose pleas may have merit,” and reduces the “risk of rival
custody proceedings.”141 The concurrence suggested that a similar
process could be effectual if implemented in the United States.142
C. The Court’s Decision Correctly Applied its Legal
and Substantive Approach
The Court’s decision involved a multi-step analysis, which
started with a strict application of the law and ended with a more
expansive approach, taking into consideration the purpose of the
Hague Convention and the possible consequences its ruling would
have on future child custody disputes.143 The Court’s approach was
deliberate. In making determinations, the Court is confined to an
application of national and international law, as these laws serve
as guidance and boundaries of the power of the courts. This does
133. See generally Chafin, 133 S.Ct. at 1029.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1030.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1030.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1030-31.
143. See generally id. at 1026-28.
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not mean, however, that the Court is precluded from incorporat-
ing social and policy considerations into its decisions. Doing so, in
fact, makes its decisions more complete as it takes into account its
real life implications. The Court’s methodology, therefore, allowed
it to incorporate a more liberal approach while still remaining
within the boundaries of the law.
With regards to the legal principles, the unanimous decision
was correct in light of the mootness doctrine and the possibilities
of relief available to the left-behind party. Article III of the U.S.
Constitution restricts the federal court’s jurisdiction to live cases
and controversies.144 That is, a case is moot where a court’s deci-
sion in a civil action or appeal will not affect the rights of the par-
ties or affect the matter in issue in the case.145 Under this strict
reading, the Court was correct to find that the courts below con-
tinue to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the parties’
claims.146
Although the Court based its analysis on only a cursory appli-
cation of the mootness doctrine, and on the potential forms of
relief available nationally, the Court’s decision is also heavily sup-
ported by a number of concrete international mechanisms through
which judgments passed by U.S. courts may be enforced. For
instance, U.S. tribunals may rely on foreign courts to award relief.
Many of the signatory states have adopted laws that codify the
Hague Convention in their states. One such law is the Child
Abduction and Custody Act 1985, the United Kingdom’s analogue
to the United States’ International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA), which codified the Hague Convention. The Act provides
that “a decision to which [Articles 7 and 12 of the Hague Conven-
tion]147 appl[y] which was made in a Contracting State other than
144. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
145. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (Our duty “is to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions
upon moot questions or abstract propositions.”); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
587 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Our job is to decide cases that matter in the
real world, not those that don’t.”).
146. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1028.
147. See Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at art. 7 (Article 7
mandates that the Central Authorities of the signatory states shall cooperate with
each other to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects of
this Convention. Article 7 further details appropriate measure which may be taken by
the central authorities of the signatory states to ensure the prompt return of child
victims.); see also id. at art. 12 (Article 12 states that where a child has been
wrongfully removed or retained, and a period of less than one year has elapsed from
the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the
return of the child. Where the proceedings have been commenced after the one-year
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the United Kingdom shall be recognized in each part of the United
Kingdom as if made by a court having jurisdiction to make it in
that part.”148 This statute serves as an avenue to enforce a U.S.
judgment in the United Kingdom, so long as the conditions speci-
fied in the Act are met.149 Applied to the instant case, the Child
Abduction and Custody Act 1985 specifically provides for enforce-
ment of U.S. court decisions in the United Kingdom.150 This means
that despite the child’s return to Scotland, there remains a live
case or controversy that may be addressed by the federal appellate
courts and it is therefore not moot.
Alternatively, the appellate courts could influence future liti-
gation in this case by relying on Scotland’s Family Law Act of
1986.151 The Family Law Act of 1986 served to amend the Child
Abduction and Custody Act 1985 and to further clarify the powers
of the courts in the recognition and enforcement of orders relating
to the custody of children.152 The act states that “an order relating
to parental responsibilities or parental rights in relation to a child
which is made outside the United Kingdom shall be recognised in
Scotland if the order was made in the country where the child was
habitually resident.”153 Thus, by statute, the courts in Scotland
would be enjoined to recognize any judgment relating to parental
rights awarded by the U.S. courts, including a reversal of the dis-
trict court’s order for the return of the child to the United States.
Within its opinion, the Court also explored beyond the four
corners of the mootness doctrine, incorporating into its reasoning
a more liberal approach that acknowledged the purpose of the
Hague Convention, social concerns, and the possible consequences
its ruling would have on future child custody disputes.154 This was
appropriate because it had already provided substantial doctrinal
support for its decision.
The Court’s supplementary approach was correct in view of
the Hague Convention’s purpose and principles. Although the
period has passed, must also order the return of the child unless the child is now
settled in its new environment. Furthermore, “where the judicial or administrative
authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to
another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of
the child.”).
148. Child Abduction and Custody Act, 1985, c. 60, § 15 (U.K.).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Family Law Act, 1986, c. 55, § 26 (U.K.).
152. See generally id.
153. Id. at § 26.
154. See generally Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1026-28 (2013).
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treaty does not provide definitive guidelines for appeals of Hague
cases, it nevertheless requires its signatory states to ensure a
speedy judicial process that secures the prompt return of the
child.155 In its decision, the Court aimed to promote the treaty’s
purpose of securing the timely return of children by defining a
framework that could be uniformly applied by the courts to ensure
expedited management of Hague cases.156 Had the Court failed to
address this issue, the lower courts would have continued to lack
definitive guidance on how to approach Hague appeals. The result
would have been overwhelming confusion and disorder, with
many courts granting automatic stays as a precautionary measure
to prevent the loss of any right to appeal.157 This blanket applica-
tion of automatic stays would serve to unduly delay the appellate
process, particularly when the appeals had little chances of suc-
cess. Because delays in the resolution of Hague convention cases
would have run counter to the intent of the treaty, the Court was
correct to go beyond a strict legal construction of the mootness
doctrine in its decision.
V. THE POSSIBLE IMPLICIT POLICY REASONS BEHIND THE
COURT’S DECISION
The Supreme Court is forthright on its goal of furthering the
treaty’s intent.158 This is evident from the manner in which both
the majority and concurring opinions discuss the very purpose of
the Hague Convention, as well as the potential social conse-
quences the Court’s ruling would have on future child custody dis-
putes.159 But, generally, the Court fails to delve deeper into its
logic. Between the lines of the majority and concurrent opinions,
however, there are implicit reasons driving the Court.
The Court identifies the child’s well-being as a primary con-
cern in its decision, reasoning that the purpose of the Hague Con-
vention is to ensure the safety and welfare of abducted children.160
The Hague Convention was designed to protect children through
procedural safeguards that deter abduction or permit for the swift
return of the child so as to prevent any unnecessary trauma or
155. See generally Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2.
156. See Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1027-28.
157. See id. at 1027.
158. See generally id. at 1026-30.
159. See generally id. at 1026-28.
160. See id. at 1026-27.
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frustration.161 The Court explicitly acknowledges that applying the
mootness doctrine to Hague Convention cases runs counter to this
very goal, as it would foreclose any possibility for a swift resolu-
tion on the issues, consequently exposing the abducted child to
unnecessary hardships.162 Implicit in the Court’s reasoning are the
psychological, physical, and emotional difficulties the children
would be exposed to if these cases were deemed moot.
The effects an international abduction may have on a child
range from the minimal to the more severe. These effects may be
short-lived, or extend into long-term or chronic symptoms result-
ing from their childhood trauma, including depression or anxi-
ety.163 According to one report, “ ‘between 10% and 40% of all
snatched American children become severely disturbed.’”164 One
adverse effect is the “deprivation of stable relationships and the
sense of loss from being suddenly uprooted.”165 If appeals are pro-
hibited after the child is removed from the United States, there is
a great incentive for parents to flee the country immediately after
a favorable decision from a lower court, and before the possibility
of appellate review. Because of the short timeframe, the removal
is usually conducted abruptly, with severe consequences. When a
child is suddenly uprooted from his home he is forced to leave
behind his family, friends, and familiar surroundings without
being afforded the time to reflect on the ongoing changes. Many
times the child is unable to say his good-byes or collect his belong-
ings,166 thereby aggravating the situation. The unfortunate result
is a sense of helplessness, of not belonging, and a loss of identity.
Moreover, when the child is uprooted he is often forced to live in
unfamiliar settings, in countries whose environment, language,
161. See Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 2, at prologue.
162. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1027.
163. Eric Lesh, Jurisdiction Friction and the Frustration of the Hague Convention:
Why International Child Abduction Cases Should Be Heard Exclusively by Federal
Courts, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 170, 171 (2011).
164. Caroline LeGette, International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention:
Emerging Practice and Interpretation of the Discretionary Exception, 25 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 287, 290 (1990) (citing Robin Jo Frank, Note, American and International
Responses to International Child Abductions, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 415, 416
(1984)).
165. Melissa S. Wills, Interpreting the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction: Why American Courts Need to Reconcile the Rights of Non-Custodial
Parents, the Best Interests of Abducted Children, and the Underlying Objectives of the
Hague Convention, 25 REV. LITIG. 423, 429 (2006).
166. Litigating International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention,
NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 116 (2012), http://www.missingkids.
com/en_US/HagueLitigationGuide/hague-litigation-guide.pdf.
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customs, and beliefs are completely foreign to him.167 These lin-
guistic and social disconnects may also serve to make the child
feel alienated and alone in the foreign country where he now
resides.
The child’s state of mind and perception of the world and the
people around him are also affected in these types of situations.
The changes may be the result of influence, intentionally or other-
wise, on the child by the abducting parent.168 In many instances
the relationship between the fleeing parent and the U.S. parent is
contentious as a result of custody and divorce disputes. In those
situations it is not unheard of for the fleeing parent to speak nega-
tively about the other parent.169 And even if that is not the case,
the fact that these disputes are ongoing tends to be influential in
formulating the child’s perceptions, and may cause psychological
problems and behavioral maladjustments in children.170 The child
may come to resent the parents,171 or believe that the U.S. parent
abandoned or does not love him.172 With time, the child’s connec-
tion to his home and U.S. parent may suffer, as time creates a
distance that slowly breaks those bonds apart.173 This means that
if too much time lapses between removal and justice in foreign
courts the child may never return to normalcy. Overall, the cata-
strophic effects sudden removal from the United States may have
on the child’s social, psychological, and emotional development
support the Court’s decision to allow appellate review where the
child’s habitual residence is in dispute.
Also implicit in the Court’s opinion are the social and policy
concerns that would arise from giving the fleeing parent unilat-
eral power to control future resolution of the case. The Court com-
ments that “a mootness holding here might . . . encourage flight in
future Hague Convention cases, as prevailing parents try to flee
the jurisdiction to moot the case.”174 The ability to moot an appeal
by departure from the United States grants the fleeing parent the
167. Wills, supra note 165, at 429.
168. Litigating International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention,
supra note 166, at 116.
169. Wills, supra note 165, at 429.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Litigating International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention,
supra note 166, at 116.
173. Brief for the National Center for Missing Children and Exploited Children as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 22, Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 638 (2012)
(No. 11-1347).
174. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1027 (2013).
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power to curtail review of the lower court’s decision and the possi-
bility of reversal of the judgment. The U.S. parent, however, is
given no such strategic power over the course of the case and any
and all future litigation is left to the foreign courts, which is
problematic.
First, relocation of the case to a foreign court may be signifi-
cantly, and unjustly, advantageous for the fleeing parent. Once
the parent has fled the United States with the child following a
district court’s return order, any petition for the return of the child
to the United States would need to be conducted in the foreign
court where the child now resides. Unfortunately, the U.S. parent
often times experiences problems obtaining return remedies
abroad.175
Difficulty with enforcement abroad arises in many different
forms,176 but in all instances the U.S. parent will feel lost and help-
less in a labyrinth of legal battles where he will be unlikely be able
to prevail. Most importantly, deference to foreign courts unfairly
inhibits U.S. parents who are financially unable to pursue legal
remedies abroad. The costs of litigating abroad can be very high
on account of the complexity and time that is necessary for the
resolution of abduction cases.177 These high costs inhibit U.S. par-
ents who do not have the economic means to pursue complex liti-
gation in defending their parental rights.
The cost of foreign litigation goes far beyond travel
expenses.178 The first part of foreign litigation is locating the
child.179 The State Department collaborates with various agencies,
including Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Inter-
national Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to locate the
abducted child.180 Nevertheless, strict reliance on this information
can stall the investigation and be damaging to the U.S. parent’s
case. The Hague Commission has identified two problems in the
location of abducted children: the inability of state authorities to
locate the missing children and a lack of adequate legal aid for the
U.S. parents once the child has been located.181 Even if the child is
located, information regarding the potential whereabouts of the
175. See generally Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 7.
176. See generally id.
177. See generally Litigating International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague
Convention, supra note 166, at 91-105.
178. Id. at 101-103.
179. Id. at 92-93.
180. Id. at 92.
181. LeGette, supra note 164, at 288.
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child may become stale between the time location occurs and the
time information is communicated to the U.S. parent.182 For these
reasons, the U.S. parent will need to rely on private investigators
to locate the child quickly. In addition, the U.S. parent will need to
incur expenses related to attorney representation in the foreign
country, any translator costs if the U.S. parent is not fluent in the
language of the foreign country, and court fees.183
Even if the U.S. parent is able to proceed with this costly liti-
gation, he might find himself trapped in a legal battle with a for-
eign court that is sympathetic to its nationals.184 In these
instances legal remedies available to the U.S. parent will be
scarce or nonexistent.185 Often times the foreign court will support
the fleeing parent by deference to cultural values. In the Middle
East, for example, a father may obtain custody more readily over a
U.S. mother on account of religious and cultural beliefs in the
superiority of men.186
Even if the U.S. parent does succeed in obtaining a return
order for the child to the United States, the road for actual return
may be long and ultimately disappointing. The return of the child
is predicated on compliance between member states and while
some signatory states, such as England, Australia, and New Zea-
land, maintain a good reputation for enforcement and return of
children under the Hague Convention,187 a significant number of
states, such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela,188 “either
ignore the procedures or demonstrate patterns of non-compliance
with the procedures.”189 In fact, non-compliance by contracting
states has become increasingly problematic.190 The U.S. Depart-
ment of State’s most recent annual compliance report indicates
that a significant number of member states voluntarily choose not
to comply with the Convention, either by denying Convention
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return applications, holding that domestic laws relating to child
custody disputes supersede the Convention, or by judicial non-
compliance.191
Several factors contribute to a state’s non-compliance.192 In
some states, policy and political reasons inhibit return enforce-
ment, while other countries will refuse to extradite its own citi-
zens.193 In other states—such as Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and
Ecuador—non-compliance is a result of incorrectly treating Hague
Convention cases as custody determinations.194 In Brazil, for
example, the courts tend to reason that abducted children “have
become ‘adapted to the Brazilian culture’ and should remain in
the country.”195 This line of reasoning is incorrect because it goes
to the merits of the custody dispute, not the true purpose of the
Convention, which mandates that custody determinations must
not be determined during Hague Convention proceedings.196
VI. WHAT PURPOSE WILL APPELLATE REVIEW HAVE
IN CHAFIN?
The question that remains is, even if the court permits appel-
late review pursuant to a child’s departure from the United
States, what effects would it have on the general disputes of
Chafin? Mr. Chafin sought reversal of the District Court’s ruling
that the child’s habitual residence is Scotland.197 Thus, on review,
the federal appellate court would be deciding whether the child’s
habitual residence is Alabama or Scotland. The problem is that
although the Hague Convention demands the return of children to
their habitual residence, it fails to define the term and instead
leaves such determination strictly to the discretion of the court.198
As a consequence, the federal circuit courts are divided on what
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characterizes a country as a habitual residence, with some empha-
sizing “the parents’ last shared subjective intentions” and others
focusing “on objective indicators of a child’s acclimatization.”199
The Eleventh Circuit, the federal appellate court that would
hear Chafin on review, adheres to consideration of shared paren-
tal intent.200 In Ruiz v. Tenoria,201 the Eleventh Circuit determined
habitual residence based on the parents shared intentions and the
objective facts of the case.202 In Ruiz, the parents of the children
had birthed and raised the children in Minnesota, but subse-
quently moved to Mexico so the father could work for his family’s
business.203 Three years after their move, marital problems devel-
oped and the mother moved to Florida with the children, without
any intention to move back to Mexico.204 The father filed a petition
for the return of the children to Mexico pursuant to the Hague
Convention.205 The Eleventh Circuit found that the parents had
failed to show a shared intention to abandon the United States as
the children’s habitual residence.206 The court additionally consid-
ered the objective facts of the case reasoning that a shared inten-
tion to abandon the previous habitual residence was not
dispositive.207 Although the court found that the children had
become acclimatized to the Mexican culture during their three-
year stay, the court found that the move to Mexico was conditional
and the children’s habitual residence never ceased being the
United States.208
Taking Ruiz as precedent, the court in Chafin would deter-
mine the child’s habitual residence to be the United States. The
facts demonstrate that the parents had a shared intention to
make Alabama the child’s habitual residence. Mr. and Ms. Chafin
had their child in Germany in 2007, one year after they were mar-
ried.209 Later that year, Ms. Chafin moved to Scotland, her home
country, with the child while Mr. Chafin was deployed to Afghani-
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stan for fifteen months.210 When Mr. Chafin returned to Germany
in 2008, the parties decided to remain separated, with Ms. Chafin
and the child continuing to reside in Scotland.211 Mr. Chafin was
subsequently transferred to Alabama in 2009.212 That is when Ms.
Chafin relocated with the child to Alabama, where she and Mr.
Chafin decided to resume cohabitation.213
While in Alabama the parties lived together as husband and
wife, despite having filed for divorce in May 2010.214 Mr. and Ms.
Chafin attended parties, went on vacation, and raised their child
together.215 During this time in Alabama, Ms. Chafin retained her
own passport, and had access to the child’s, and was free to leave
to Scotland at any time,216 although that was not the intention.
Despite the ongoing divorce proceedings, Ms. Chafin made the
United States her and the child’s home.217 Ms. Chafin remodeled
the family home, and the child was enrolled in school.218 In fact,
Ms. Chafin had previously admitted in a divorce proceeding that
she never mentioned to anyone that her intention was to live in
the United States conditionally; instead, anyone who testified
claimed she expressed her intentions to make the United States
her permanent residence.219 Ms. Chafin even began her applica-
tion with the U.S. government to obtain her permanent resi-
dency.220 It was not until Ms. Chafin faced deportation that she
claimed Scotland was the child’s habitual residence.221
The facts of this case demonstrate that both parties intended
for the United States to be the child’s habitual residence. In the
approximately two years that the child lived in the United States,
there was never any indication that the child was to return to
Scotland or that living in Alabama would be conditional. Both par-
ties took steps to make Alabama the child’s home and to permit
her to acclimatize to living in the United States. In light of the
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parent’s shared intentions, the Eleventh Circuit is likely to find
that the child’s habitual residence is the United States, and will
thus reverse the district court’s ruling.
VII. CONCLUSION
In essence, the Court in Chafin v. Chafin was correct in going
beyond merely a legalistic interpretation of the mootness doctrine
in formulating its decision. In order to adhere to the principles of
the Hague Convention, the Court needed to embrace a more
expansive approach that took into consideration the treaty’s pur-
pose and the possible consequences its ruling would have on
future child abduction cases. A holding that removal of the child
pursuant to a return order under the Hague Convention does not
moot the case; instead it promotes judicial uniformity while serv-
ing the best interests of the child. Furthermore, by establishing a
standardized test for granting stays, the Court ensures that the
very purpose of the treaty is met—“to secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting
State.”222
222. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 1, at art. 1 (a).
